The past few weeks, I've been doing research for a final paper in my colloquium class (Latin American Refugees from 1970-Present) and, due to the pandemic-induced lack of events otherwise occurring on campus, I figured that sharing my research made for a decent blog post.
As the course name suggests, we're focused largely on refugee movements—which means that, by extension, we're focused on human rights violations in Latin America. The 20th century was hotbed of human rights violations in Central America especially, seeing numerous attempted coups (failed and successful).
El Salvador actually saw two attempted coups during the 20th century: one in the '30s and one in the '80s. Neither saw a decisive victory for the rebels. In the '80s, the so-called Civil War began as a last resort. With the clear precedent that democratic attempts at reform would not put an end to the massive structural inequality that plagued El Salvador, guerrilla leftists took up arms out of desperation. The government had made it clear that peaceful attempts to enact change would go nowhere; the rebels felt as though they were left without another option.
The government repression that followed is infamous for its brutal nature. Paramilitary death squads—many funded and trained by the U.S.—roved through the countryside, exterminating entire villages at a whim. "The guerrilla is the fish, the people are the sea," one government general proclaimed. "If you cannot catch the fish, you have to drain the sea."
Thus, the Salvadoran state drained the sea, killing guerrillas and campesinos indiscriminately. Because of this, modern scholarship often falls into the trap of assuming—like the aforementioned general—that "peasant" was synonymous with "rebel." After all, it makes sense—the left was purportedly fighting for greater equity. Why wouldn't every campesino join up with the revolution? Well, many did. The rebellion was largely mobilized in rural, grassroots efforts. But nevertheless, some peasants joined the counterinsurgency. One source mentions that, in a sample of one counterinsurgency battalion, 11 out of 12 soldiers were members of the rural peasantry. Why is this?
I've identified four reasons that a campesino may have felt obliged to join the counterinsurgency:
1. Economic Gain: The monoculture in El Salvador created little more than fiscal inequality. As coffee prices plummeted, so did chances for social mobility. To grow up a peasant was to grow up without.
However, members of elite military academies reaped the benefits of a corrupt military society. Upon graduation, a cadet was afforded the opportunity to import a car duty-free; he often sold this privilege to a civilian. Military officers maintained "phantom soldiers," enlisted men who did not really exist. The officers would then deposit these men's wages into battalion slush funds, and grow rich from the proceeds. Even second lieutenants could be seen driving BMWs—a staggering difference in wealth from the landless peasantry.
Thus, joining the military may have provided opportunities for personal advancement and the ability to provide for loved ones.
2. Political Opposition to the Guerrillas: One report from 1988 details the FMLN rebel force storming into the hamlet of Nahuaterique, (falsely) accusing the villagers of working with the counterinsurgency, and then executing an 18-year-old for emphasis. Such interactions would surely have functioned as incentive to distance oneself from the FLMN, if not to work against them entirely.
3. Self-Preservation: It is also reasonable to think that many peasants may have sided with the government out of fear. If the paramilitaries provided a join-or-die ultimatum, many may have opted for the former. Furthermore, one peasant-turned-soldier in Guatemala echoes this concern in an interview: Once he joined and abandoned his village, he lost all respect in their eyes. Thus, he had no incentive to turn his back on the government and return to his old life. In prioritizing his wellbeing, he irreparably burnt bridges; there was no reason for him to endanger his life by defecting now that his village had disowned him.
4. World Context: Around the same time, failed leftist revolts in Chile and Guatemala surely weighed heavily on the guerrillas' consciences. The precedent that the government, backed by the U.S., would stop at nothing to crush the rebellion would have discouraged many from siding with the left. Furthermore, one dossier from a USMC Major General cites U.S. legitimacy as a major reason that the counterinsurgency succeeded. The aura of legitimacy provided by the support of the world's foremost military power should not be understated. On one side, you had bushwhackers with stolen pistols; on the other, a military with the aid of the most powerful martial force on the planet. There may have seemed to be little choice.
Importantly, seeking to understand is not the same as seeking to justify. I don't mean to sanction the actions of the right during the civil war by any means, nor am I trying to imply that a difficult situation excuses atrocities. Instead, I simply wish to better comprehend the circumstances that pushed many peasants to side with the counterinsurgency so as to better prevent them in the future.




